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I. INTRODUCTION 
The criminal law—a beautiful, albeit sometimes ramshackle, 
institution devoted to blaming and punishing culpable agents—has been 
 
* J.D., Ph.D.  Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology 
and Law in Psychiatry, and Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience & Society, University 
of Pennsylvania.  This Article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law 
delivered at Marquette Law School in November 2014.  I thank Dean Joseph Kearney, 
Professors Janine Kim, Matthew Parlow, Daniel Blinka, and Michael McChrystal, and all their 
colleagues for making my visit to Marquette so stimulating and pleasant. 
This Article distills, draws on, and extends the work I have been doing on law and 
neuroscience for two decades.  Many of the arguments are familiar, but until there are 
conceptual or scientific breakthroughs—and none is on the horizon—this is my story and I’m 
sticking to it.   
 I am indebted to the readers and critics, who are too numerous to mention, who have 
helped me refine my positions.  Michael Moore deserves special mention, however, for no one 
has taught me as much.  I also thank Ed Greenlee, as always, for his superb, invaluable help. 
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developing for well over half a millennium to help us live together.  It is 
the product of an immense number of judicial decisions and penal 
statutes, and it has stood the test of time as the product of human trial 
and error.  We common lawyers like to think that it is impossible to 
produce an ex ante watertight criminal code.  As is well known, the Model 
Penal Code, an enterprise produced by the best and the brightest, has 
been subjected to intense criticism, and even states that have been heavily 
influenced by it have made substantial changes.  Instead, common lawyers 
believe that the bottom-up, “organic” methodology of the common-law 
process in interaction with penal codes will ultimately produce reasonably 
coherent and just, but not perfect, criminal law. 
The criminal law is a thoroughly folk-psychological enterprise.1  
Doctrine and practice implicitly assume that human beings are agents, 
creatures who act intentionally for reasons, who can be guided by reasons, 
and who in adulthood are capable of sufficient rationality to ground full 
responsibility unless an excusing condition obtains.  We all take this 
“standard picture” for granted because it is the foundation not just of law 
but of interpersonal relations generally, including how we explain 
ourselves to others and to ourselves. 
The law’s concept of the person and responsibility has been under 
assault throughout the modern scientific era, but in the last few decades 
dazzling technological innovations and discoveries in some sciences, 
especially the new neuroscience and to a lesser extent genetics, have put 
unprecedented pressure on the standard picture.  For example, in a 2002 
editorial published in The Economist, the following warning was given: 
“Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society 
homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature.  But neuroscience 
could do all of these things first.”2  Consider the following statement from 
a widely noticed chapter by neuroscientists Joshua Greene of Harvard 
and Jonathan Cohen of Princeton, which I quote at length to give the full 
flavor of the claim being made: 
[A]s more and more scientific facts come in, providing 
increasingly vivid illustrations of what the human mind is really 
like, more and more people will develop moral intuitions that are 
at odds with our current social practices . . . . 
 Neuroscience has a special role to play in this process for the 
following reason.  As long as the mind remains a black box, there 
 
1.  I discuss the meaning of folk psychology more thoroughly in Part IV. 
2.  The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 77, 77, 
www.economist.com/node/1143317/print [http://perma.cc/3DKJ-9GAZ]. 
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will always be a donkey on which to pin dualist and libertarian 
intuitions. . . . What neuroscience does, and will continue to do at 
an accelerated pace, is elucidate the “when”, “where” and “how” 
of the mechanical processes that cause behaviour.  It is one thing 
to deny that human decision-making is purely mechanical when 
your opponent offers only a general, philosophical argument.  It is 
quite another to hold your ground when your opponent can make 
detailed predictions about how these mechanical processes work, 
complete with images of the brain structures involved and 
equations that describe their function. 
. . . . 
 At some further point . . . , [p]eople may grow up completely 
used to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical 
process, the outcome of which is completely determined by the 
results of prior mechanical processes.  What will such people think 
as they sit in their jury boxes? . . . Will jurors of the future wonder 
whether the defendant . . . could have done otherwise?  Whether 
he really deserves to be punished . . . ?  We submit that these 
questions, which seem so important today, will lose their grip in 
an age when the mechanical nature of human decision-making is 
fully appreciated.  The law will continue to punish misdeeds, as it 
must for practical reasons, but the idea of distinguishing the truly, 
deeply guilty from those who are merely victims of neuronal 
circumstances will, we submit, seem pointless.3 
This is not the familiar metaphysical claim that determinism is 
incompatible with responsibility, about which I will say more below.4  It 
is a far more radical claim that denies the conception of personhood and 
action that underlies not only criminal responsibility but the coherence of 
law as a normative institution.  It thus completely conflicts with our 
common sense.  As the eminent philosopher of mind and action, Jerry 
Fodor, has written: 
[W]e have . . . no decisive reason to doubt that very many 
commonsense belief/desire explanations are—literally—true. 
 Which is just as well, because if commonsense intentional 
psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond 
 
3.  Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 207, 217–18 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 
2006). 
4.  See ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 23-31 (2005) 
(explaining incompatibilism).  I return to the subject in Parts III and V below.  For now, it is 
sufficient to note that there are good answers to this challenge. 
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comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of 
our species; if we’re that wrong about the mind, then that’s the 
wrongest we’ve ever been about anything.  The collapse of the 
supernatural, for example, didn’t compare; theism never came 
close to being as intimately involved in our thought and our 
practice . . . as belief/desire explanation is.  Nothing except, 
perhaps, our commonsense physics—our intuitive commitment to 
a world of observer-independent, middle-sized objects—comes as 
near our cognitive core as intentional explanation does.  We’ll be 
in deep, deep trouble if we have to give it up. 
 I’m dubious . . . that we can give it up; that our intellects are so 
constituted that doing without it ( . . . really doing without it; not 
just loose philosophical talk) is a biologically viable option.  But 
be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right.5 
The central thesis of this Article is that Fodor is correct and that our 
commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the 
legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by 
contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience 
and genetics.  These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least 
not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to 
legal doctrine, practice, and policy. 
I first address the criminal law’s motivation and the motivation of 
some advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative 
problems that law addresses.  The next part discusses how I think the law 
should respond to the metaphysical issues that underpin our concepts of 
action and responsibility.  Then the Article considers the law’s psychology 
and its concepts of the person and responsibility.  Next, I describe the 
general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the issue 
of “translation.”  The following part canvasses various distractions, 
especially determinism and the notion that causation is per se an excusing 
condition, that have bedeviled clear thinking about the relation of 
scientific, causal accounts of behavior to responsibility.  Next, I examine 
the limits of neurolaw and then consider why neuroscience does not pose 
a genuinely radical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and 
responsibility.  The penultimate part makes a case for cautious optimism 
about the contribution that neuroscience may make to criminal law in the 
near and intermediate term.  A brief conclusion follows.  Throughout, 
common sense is my guiding star. 
 
5.  JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND xii (1987). 
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II. NEUROEXUBERANCE 
Advances in neuroimaging since the early 1990s have been the source 
of the exuberance.  Two in particular stand out: the discovery of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which allows noninvasive 
measurement of neural functioning, and the availability of ever-higher-
resolution scanners, known colloquially as “magnets” because they use 
powerful magnetic fields to collect the data that are ultimately expressed 
in the colorful brain images that appear in the scientific and popular 
media.  Bedazzled by the technology and the many impressive findings, 
however, too many legal scholars and advocates have made claims for the 
relevance of the new neuroscience to law that are unsupported by the 
data6 or that are conceptually confused.7  I have termed this tendency 
“brain overclaim syndrome (BOS)” and have recommended “cognitive 
jurotherapy (CJ)” as the appropriate therapy.8 
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how 
we should regulate our lives in a complex society.  How do we live 
together?  What are the duties we owe each other?  For violations of those 
duties, when is the state justified in imposing the most afflictive—but 
sometimes justified—exercises of state power, criminal blame, and 
punishment?9  When should we do this, to whom, and how much? 
Virtually every legal issue is contested—consider criminal 
responsibility, for example—and there is always room for debate about 
policy, doctrine, and adjudication.  In a recent book, Professor Robin 
Feldman has argued that law lacks the courage forthrightly to address the 
difficult normative issues that it faces.10  The law therefore adopts what 
Feldman terms an “internalizing” and an “externalizing” strategy for 
using science to try to avoid the difficulties.11  In the internalizing strategy, 
the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria.  A futuristic example 
 
6.  Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW 
AND NEUROSCIENCE 529 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010). 
7.  See, e.g., MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: 
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2013); Michael S. Moore, 
Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 207 
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). 
8.  Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509 (2013); Stephen J. 
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006). 
9.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process requires that 
every conviction be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt as to every element of the 
crime). 
10.  ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009). 
11.  Id. at 19–21, 37–39. 
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might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility.  In the 
externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical experts to 
make the decision.  An example would be using forensic clinicians to 
decide whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and then 
simply rubberstamping the clinician’s opinion.  Neither strategy is 
successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and impedes 
legal evolution and progress.  Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree, 
that the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly 
claimed.  Rather, it errs by using it too much, because the law is insecure 
about its resources and capacities to do justice.12 
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to have 
extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuroscience to law, 
especially criminal law.  Here is my speculation about the source.  Many 
people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive justice, 
thinking that they are prescientific and harsh.  Their hope is that the new 
neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true, no 
offender is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that 
the law should adopt a consequentially based prediction/prevention 
system of social control guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-
kings who will finally have supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.13  
Then, they believe, criminal justice will be kinder, fairer, and more 
rational.  They do not recognize, however, that most of the draconian 
innovations in criminal law that have led to so much incarceration—such 
as recidivist enhancements, mandatory minimum sentences, and the 
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparities—were all driven by 
consequential concerns for deterrence and incapacitation.  Moreover, as 
C.S. Lewis recognized long ago, such a scheme is disrespectful and 
dehumanizing.14  Finally, there is nothing inherently harsh about 
retributivism.  It is a theory of justice that may be applied toughly or 
tenderly. 
On a more modest level, many advocates think that neuroscience may 
not revolutionize criminal justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that 
many more offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh 
punishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system.  Four 
decades ago, our criminal justice system would have been using 
psychodynamic psychology for the same purpose.  More recently, 
 
12.  Id. at 199–200. 
13.  Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, are exemplars of this type of thinking.  I will discuss 
the normative inertness of this position in Part VIII. 
14.  C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224 (1953). 
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genetics has been employed in a similar manner.  The impulse, however, 
is clear: jettison desert, or at least mitigate, judgments of desert.  As will 
be shown below, however, these advocates often adopt an untenable 
theory of mitigation or an excuse that quickly collapses into the nihilistic 
conclusion that no one is really criminally responsible. 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SPOCKIAN METHODOLOGY 
One is always “doing” metaphysics whether or not one is aware of it.  
About some legal issues, it scarcely matters, but about the types of issues 
that the new sciences address, such as the causation of action (the mind-
body problem) and the criteria for responsibility (compatibilism vs. 
incompatibilism), metaphysical assumptions matter.  The question is 
whether one must resolve or even defend one’s metaphysical and other 
philosophical foundations in these fraught areas.  I think not.  I make no 
claim for metaphysical or philosophical quietism because I believe that 
metaphysical questions are conceptually and practically important in 
many cases.15  I shall suggest, however, that, when philosophy is 
foundational and practically important, one’s position must be 
acknowledged but need not be defended or, a fortiori, resolved. 
Please do the following thought experiment.  Imagine that you do a 
content analysis of high-level introductory texts in metaphysics or in any 
other area in philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind and action.  The 
intrepid investigator will find, without exception, that each text will 
describe many different, often contradictory, approaches to the central 
questions.  What is the relation of the potential truth of determinism to 
the possibility of “free will” and responsibility?  Every text will discuss 
libertarianism, hard determinism, and compatibilism.  Are there moral 
truths independent of our constructs and practices?  Every text will 
discuss varieties of realism, antirealism, and everything in between.  What 
is the relation of the brain to consciousness, mind, and action?  Every text 
will present various forms of physicalism and the like.  There will almost 
always be good arguments for and against the various positions, but none 
will have clearly dominated, although some, such as substance dualism, 
will be included largely for historical reasons.  Moreover, it is a science 
fiction fantasy to believe that science will resolve the most fundamental 
problems that might in principle admit of empirical solutions, at least in 
the lifetimes of the readers of this Article.  Consequently, all the 
contenders will be left standing.  To paraphrase the noted metaphysician, 
 
15.  See generally Charles L. Barzun, Metaphysical Quietism and Functional Explanation 
in the Law, 34 LAW & PHIL. 89 (2015) (arguing for metaphysical engagement). 
 46 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:39 
Lewis Carroll, everyone has won (at least in his or her own eyes) and all 
must have prizes. 
What is a poor, country lawyer-scholar supposed to do in such 
circumstances when trying to make normative arguments about doctrine, 
practice, and policy?  One possibility is to master all the metaphysical 
arguments relevant to the question being addressed, take a position, and 
try to defend it against the counterarguments.  This seems like a bootless 
enterprise, however, if one’s training is not in metaphysics and if one is 
primarily interested in doctrine, practice, and policy.  Arguing 
metaphysics, or other basic philosophical issues, is not the country lawyer-
scholar’s comparative advantage, and it will not lead to an 
uncontroversial position, even if one were to achieve sufficient mastery.  
Further, the history of the law suggests that country lawyers can “run the 
railroad” without even recognizing the foundational issues that are 
implicated.  If philosophical understanding is not the goal, it is in large 
measure a distraction.  So the original question remains: How should one 
proceed? 
My current preferred approach is what I call “Spockian solutions,” or 
what to do until the doctors of metaphysics and science arrive to cure our 
metaphysical and empirical ills.  By Spockian I do not mean the cold-
bloodedly, rational Vulcan, Dr. Spock, of Star Trek fame.  I refer to the 
even more famous pediatrician and author, Dr. Benjamin M. Spock 
(1903–1998), whose many editions of the influential child care manual, 
Baby and Child Care, guided parents over the shoals of child-rearing for 
many generations.16  At a time when it was more difficult to obtain 
medical attention for one’s sick child, the book was replete with formulas 
for ameliorating the problem—be it fever, diarrhea, or any other of the 
common ills that beset children17—until the doctor came (doctors made 
house calls in the past) or until the parents and child could make it to the 
doctor. 
In the spirit of Dr. Spock, my legal home remedy is to start with a 
normative position that is attractive at the non-metaphysical level of 
applied ethical, moral, political, and legal theory.  If this position is 
consistent with a reasonable metaphysics that does not conflict with 
relatively uncontroversial, or at least plausible, empirical accounts about 
the world and with other reasonable philosophical theories, then one can 
 
16.  BENJAMIN SPOCK, BABY AND CHILD CARE (4th ed. 1976).  I cite an earlier edition 
because the following examples are drawn from it.  The book is now in its ninth edition (with 
Robert Needlman). 
17.  Id. at 235-37 (diarrhea), 501-02 (high fever). 
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proceed without defending the metaphysics, the empirics, and the other 
philosophical positions.  Common sense should enter the analysis, too.  
Any position that violates common sense should meet the most 
demanding burden of persuasion.  Once one’s foundational position is 
adopted, however, the scholar does have the duty to avoid adopting 
normative positions that require inconsistent metaphysical or other 
foundational positions unless there is good reason why different 
metaphysics or foundations may be appropriate for different contexts. 
This home remedy is intellectually defensible.  A plausible basic 
position must be taken, which requires reasonable understanding.  A 
critic might point out all the reasons that the chosen metaphysics or other 
philosophical foundation is questionable and, therefore, that the 
normative position adopted might seem unjustified.  But a sophisticated 
metaphysician who adheres to the chosen metaphysics would have 
answers, and there would be no decisive arguments to refute the 
sophisticate.  Trying to defend a metaphysics at the level of professional 
philosophy involves too much “inside baseball” analysis when one is 
trying to accomplish something else. 
Now let me turn to examples of the home remedy that are relevant to 
the other topics this Article addresses.  The basic questions that run 
through most are the relation of the brain (or body, or matter) to mind 
and action and the implications of the truth of determinism.  I am a 
physicalist about the former.  The brain enables the mind and action, but 
we have no idea how, despite all the astonishing advances in neuroscience 
and other disciplines.18  Indeed, the problem of consciousness may be 
insoluble,19 although perhaps progress can be made on mental states and 
actions.  How do we know that the brain enables the mind and action?  
Well, if your brain is dead, you are dead, and to the best of our knowledge, 
you have no mental states and aren’t doing much at all (although your 
heart and lungs may still be working if your brain stem is still alive). 
Assuming that the brain does enable the mind and action, is the 
relation reductive or not?  Is property dualism true?  Can mental states 
cause changes in physical states, or does the exclusion principle require 
that causation can only run from the physical to the mental?  At present, 
 
18.  PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 
11–12 (2d ed. 1998); Ralph Adolphs, The Unsolved Problems of Neuroscience, 19 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 173,175 (2015). 
19.  See, e.g., COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A 
MATERIAL WORLD (1999). 
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nonreductive physicalism is probably the dominant view, but neither I nor 
anyone else can decisively answer the foregoing and similar questions. 
I subscribe to the causal theory of action (CTA), of which there are 
many forms and many criticisms.20  CTA roughly holds that an event 
(behavioral or mental) is an action if it is caused in the right way by mental 
states.  I am happy to adopt any version of CTA that accords with 
common sense and the folk-psychological theory that we always use to 
explain ourselves to ourselves and to others.21  Moreover, there is a 
plausible philosophical argument that causation can run from the mental 
to the physical despite the exclusion principle.22  I am not suggesting 
anything mysterious or any form of sui generis agent-causation.  In 
principle, how action happens will be explicable according to whatever 
scientific laws governing the rest of the universe might be discovered.  The 
task of neuroscience should be to explain agency, not to explain it away 
reductively. 
So there is good foundational reason to adopt the CTA and to 
continue to hold that we are agents who can act for, and be guided by, 
reasons and whose most habitual or thoughtless behavior can be brought 
under the control of reason if the person has reason to do so. 
On the foundational question of whether mental states can be reduced 
to brain or other physical states, I am most attracted to nonreductive 
physicalism.  We have a mind/brain, which is only one substance, but it 
has both physical and mental properties.  The latter are emergent and 
cannot be reduced fully to the former.  This appears the most 
commonsensical view, and there is no scientific reason to doubt it at 
present.  The greatest experts cannot resolve this issue; no more can a 
poor, country lawyer-scholar.  Luckily I do not have to.  It is sufficient 
that there are plausible, philosophical accounts that are consistent with 
CTA and folk-psychological explanations.  I am perfectly content 
opportunistically to adopt any of them. 
I am thoroughly a compatibilist on the metaphysical question of 
 
20.  Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff, The Causal Theory of Action: Origins and 
Issues, in CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS 1 (Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff eds., 2010) 
(providing a useful overview).  The volume contains many excellent chapters addressing the 
issues in more detail. 
21.  In this respect, I am particularly attracted to Michael Moore’s recently revised 
account.  Michael S. Moore, Renewed Questions About the Causal Theory of Action, in 
CAUSING HUMAN ACTIONS, supra note 20, at 27.  See generally JOHN HYMAN, ACTION, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL (2015) (providing a fascinating account of the current state of the 
philosophy of action and a surely controversial theory of its own). 
22.  Christian List & Peter Menzies, Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the 
Exclusion Principle, 106 J. PHIL. 475 (2009). 
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whether genuine responsibility is possible in a deterministic (or 
something quite like that) universe.  This is the generic view, expressed 
in many forms by different theorists,23 that although no one has 
libertarian free will—the ability to act uncaused by anything but oneself—
genuine responsibility is possible even in a determinist universe.  Agents 
must simply have the capacity to determine their actions by reasons and 
to act in light of those reasons and are not compelled to act in the ordinary 
meaning of compulsion (say, a gun to the head).  The God-like power of 
libertarian or contra-causal freedom is not necessary for responsibility on 
this earth.  As is argued below, nothing in current neuroscience suggests 
that people do not have these capacities,24 and it is clear that most people 
most of the time are not compelled in the ordinary sense when they act. 
Compatibilism is almost certainly the dominant view among 
professional philosophers,25 but it is of course controversial and a 
metaphysical question that science cannot resolve.  Many people 
probably intuitively believe that we have libertarian free will, and 
certainly that belief is consistent with criminal law doctrine.  This position 
is extremely implausible in the modern scientific age, however.  Human 
beings, as complex as they are, are still part of the physical universe and 
subject to the same laws that govern all phenomena.  I will return to the 
consistency of determinism with doctrines of criminal responsibility 
below,26 but for now it is sufficient to note that compatibilism is also 
consistent with all criminal law doctrines and mostly accords with 
common sense in the modern scientific era.  It is a perfectly good home 
remedy. 
I take no position on the vexed question of whether anyone can do 
otherwise even if the CTA is true.  There is dispute about how the 
principle of alternative possibilities should be interpreted, and, like Jay 
 
23.  See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semicompatibilism: New 
Work, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 243 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011); 
Michael McKenna, Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive 
Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 175; Paul Russell, Moral Sense 
and the Foundations of Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 
199; Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett, Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking 
Causes and Possibilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra, at 221. 
24.  See infra Part VIII. 
25.  David Bourget & David J. Chalmers, What Do Philosophers Believe?, 170 PHIL. 
STUD. 465, 476 (2014) (reporting the results of a 2009 survey of professional philosophers that 
showed that a majority are either compatibilists or tend towards compatibilism); The 
PhilPapers Surveys: Preliminary Survey Results, PHILPAPERS, http://philpapers.org/surveys/re
sults.pl [http://perma.cc/DS94-5RUW] (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
26.  See infra Part V. 
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Wallace,27 I very much doubt that foundational questions of responsibility 
will be decided by precious deployment of modal logic.  There are 
sufficient, extant arguments to suggest that the principle of alternative 
possibilities is not a problem.28  They are controversial, but this question 
will not be solved to everyone’s satisfaction, and we have a railroad to 
run.  I am a compatibilist, a perfectly plausible metaphysics, and will 
continue to believe that robust responsibility is possible until an 
incontrovertible argument that all would accept requires me to jettison 
this view. 
In short, CTA and compatibilism are my bedrock metaphysics.  If 
anyone else wishes to claim that I need a particular type of CTA theory 
or compatibilism, I am happy to take that as a friendly amendment.  
Giving up CTA or compatibilism would undermine my work in general 
and the arguments of this Article in particular, but happily, nothing in 
philosophy or science suggests that I must do so for now. 
IV. THE LAW’S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Criminal law presupposes a “folk psychological” view of the person and 
behavior.29  This psychological theory causally explains behavior in part by 
mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans.30  
Biological and other psychological and sociological variables also play a 
causal role, and a complete explanation would involve variables from all 
levels of all these fields.31  But folk psychology considers mental states 
fundamental to a full causal explanation and understanding of human 
action.  Lawyers, philosophers, and scientists argue about the definitions 
of mental states and theories of action, but that does not undermine the 
general claim that mental states are fundamental.  The arguments and 
 
27.  R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 202, 251–65 
(1994). 
28.  See, e.g., KADRI VIHVELIN, CAUSES, LAWS, AND FREE WILL: WHY DETERMINISM 
DOESN’T MATTER (2013). 
29.  Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal 
Law, 25 LAW & PHIL. 571, 571 (2006). 
30.  This meaning of folk psychology as a casual explanatory theory of action must be 
distinguished from the usage of the term to refer to bits of folk wisdom about the content of 
those mental states.  For example, folk wisdom is that adolescents are more impulsive than 
adults.  Any of the latter might be disconfirmed by empirical evidence, but the former can be 
disconfirmed only if the radical critique is demonstrated to be true.  See infra Part VIII for a 
discussion of this possibility. 
31.  This is known as a multifield, multilevel mode of explanation.  See CARL F. CRAVER, 
EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE (2007). 
 2015] CRIMINAL LAW AND COMMON SENSE 51 
evidence that disputants use to convince others presuppose the folk-
psychological view of the person.  Brains do not convince each other, 
people do.  Folk psychology presupposes only that human action will at 
least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or will be responsive 
to reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions. 
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why you are 
reading this Article is roughly that you desire to understand the relation 
of neuroscience to criminal responsibility; you believe that reading the 
Article will help fulfill that desire.  As a result of your desire and belief, you 
formed the intention to read it.  This is a practical, rather than a deductive, 
syllogism. 
Brief reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a 
folk-psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious—and 
potentially self-conscious—creature who forms and acts on intentions that 
are the product of the person’s other mental states.  We are the sort of 
creatures who can act for, and respond to, reasons.  The law treats persons 
generally as intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of 
nature. 
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide people directly 
and indirectly unless people are capable of using rules as premises in their 
reasoning about how they should behave.  Unless people could be guided 
by law, it would be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding 
system of rules.32  Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because these 
rules provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for 
forbearance or action.  Human behavior can be modified by means other 
than influencing deliberation, and human beings do not always deliberate 
before they act.  Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology, even 
 
32.  See GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 123 (2006) (stating that although 
philosophers disagree about the requirements and justifications of what morality requires, 
there is widespread agreement that “the primary task of morality is to guide action”); Scott J. 
Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127, 131–32 (2000); 
John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, 49 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 33, 35 (2002). 
This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to guide conduct, but a contrary 
assumption is largely incoherent.  As Shapiro writes: 
 Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine.  It is absurd because the law cannot be 
the sort of thing that is unknowable.  If a system of norms were unknowable, then that 
system would not be a legal system.  One important reason why the law must be 
knowable is that its function is to guide conduct. 
Shapiro, supra, at 131.  I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of 
precise action guidance.  If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear most of the 
time, however, the system could not function.  Further, the principle of legality dictates that 
criminal law rules should be especially clear. 
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when we most habitually follow the legal rules.  Unless people are capable 
of understanding and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, the law 
is powerless to affect human behavior. 
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always 
reason or consistently behave rationally according to some preordained, 
normative notion of rationality.  Rather, the law’s view is that people are 
capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional, 
socially constructed standards.  The type of rationality the law requires is 
the ordinary person’s commonsense view of rationality, not the technical 
notion that might be acceptable within the disciplines of economics, 
philosophy, psychology, computer science, and the like.  Rationality is a 
congeries of abilities, including inter alia getting the facts straight, having a 
relatively coherent preference-ordering, understanding what variables are 
relevant to action, and the ability to understand how to achieve the goals 
one has (instrumental rationality).  How these abilities should be 
interpreted and how much of them are necessary for responsibility may be 
debated, but the debate is about rationality. 
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed, 
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation and, in principle, 
is responsive to reasons, including incentives.  Machines may cause harm, 
but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how 
people ought to live together.  Machines do not deserve praise, blame, 
reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or as a 
consequence of the results they cause.  Only people, intentional agents with 
the potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations of what they 
owe each other. 
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action might 
consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientific view of human 
behavior.  For the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on the 
folk-psychological model of the person and behavior described.  Until and 
unless scientific discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is 
radically wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will 
remain central.  It is vital that we not lose sight of this model lest we fall 
into confusion when various claims based on neuroscience or other sciences 
are made.  If any science is to have appropriate influence on current 
criminal law and legal decision making, the science must be relevant to and 
translated into the law’s folk-psychological framework. 
All of the criminal law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are 
folk psychological.  Begin with the definitional criteria, the “elements” of 
crime.  The “voluntary” act requirement is defined, roughly, as an intentional 
bodily movement—or omission in cases in which the person has a duty to 
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act—done in a reasonably integrated state of consciousness.  Other than 
crimes of strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable mental state, such 
as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness.  All affirmative defenses of 
justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the person’s mental state, 
such as the belief that self-defensive force was necessary or the lack of 
knowledge of right from wrong.  
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow 
logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself, from its folk-
psychological concept of the person and action, and from the aims of 
achieving retributive justice, which holds that no one should be punished 
unless he deserves it and no more than he deserves, and the maximization 
of social safety.  The general capacity for rationality is the primary condition 
for responsibility, and the lack of that capacity is the primary condition for 
excusing a person.  If human beings were not rational creatures who could 
understand the good reasons for action and were not capable of 
conforming to legal requirements through intentional action or 
forbearance, the law could not adequately guide action and would not be 
just.  Legally responsible agents are therefore people who have the general 
capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular legal 
contexts.33 
In cases of excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a 
reason but is either incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the 
specific occasion in question.  This explains, for example, why young 
children and some people with mental disorders are not held responsible.  
The amount of lack of capacity for rationality that is necessary to find the 
agent not responsible is a moral, social, political, and, ultimately, a legal 
issue.  It is not a scientific, medical, psychological, or psychiatric issue. 
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition.  Literal 
compulsion exists when the person’s bodily movement is a pure mechanism 
that is not rationalizable by reference to the agent’s mental states.  These 
cases defeat the requirement of a “voluntary act.”  For example, a tremor 
or spasm produced by a neurological disorder is not an action because it is 
not intentional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.  
Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts intentionally but in 
response to some hard choice imposed on the agent through no fault of his 
or her own.  For example, if a miscreant holds a gun to an agent’s head and 
threatens to kill her unless she kills another innocent person, it would be 
wrong to kill under these circumstances.  Nevertheless, the law may decide 
 
33.  I adapt the felicitous phrase “to grasp and be guided by good reason” from 
WALLACE, supra note 27, at 86. 
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as a normative matter to excuse the act of intentional killing because the 
agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be supremely difficult 
for most citizens to resist.34 
Cases involving internal compulsive states are more difficult to 
conceptualize because it is difficult to define and assess “loss of control.”35  
The cases that most fit this category are “disorders of desire,” such as 
addictions and sexual disorders.  The question is why these acting agents 
lack control but other people with strong desires do not.  If people 
frequently yield to their apparently very strong desires at great social, 
medical, occupational, financial, and legal cost to themselves, agents will 
often say they could not help themselves, they were not in control, and an 
excuse or mitigation is therefore warranted.  But why mitigation or excuse 
should obtain is difficult to understand. 
V. DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEUROSCIENCE AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
This part considers a number of related issues that are often thought to 
be relevant to criminal responsibility and competence but that are in fact 
irrelevant, confusing, and distracting: free will, causation as an excuse, 
causation as compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-
efficacy of mental states, many of which have already been touched upon.  
It is important to correct these errors because much of the unjustified legal 
exuberance about the contributions of neuroscience to criminal law flows 
from them.  The legal exuberance also flows, however, from unrealistic 
expectations about the scientific accomplishments of neuroscience.  A later 
part of this Article addresses the scientific exuberance. 
Contrary to what many people believe, and what judges and others 
sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is part of any doctrine, 
and it is not even foundational for criminal responsibility.36  As Part III 
noted when adopting a compatibilist metaphysics about responsibility, 
criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of determinism or 
universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations of 
responsibility.  Even if determinism is true, some people act and some 
 
34.  I recognize that the common law and most state codes do not permit a duress excuse 
when innocent life is taken.  In contrast, section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code would permit 
the excuse in appropriate cases, and this example makes the point most clearly without 
confusing duress/necessity as a justification and duress as an excuse. 
35.  Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 
1035 (2002); see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423–24 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36.  Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and 
Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203, 207 (2007). 
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people do not.  Some people form prohibited mental states, and some do 
not.  Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they commit 
crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or acting under duress.  
Moreover, these distinctions matter to moral and legal theories of 
responsibility and fairness that we have reason to endorse.  Criminal law 
addresses problems genuinely related to responsibility, including 
consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention and 
knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and compulsion.  The law, however, 
never addresses the presence or absence of free will.  
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of legal 
responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a synonym for the 
conclusion that the defendant was or was not criminally responsible.  They 
typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that do not involve free 
will understood as contra-causal freedom—for example, that the defendant 
was legally insane or acted under duress—but such use of the term, “free 
will,” only perpetuates misunderstanding and confusion.  Once the legal 
criteria for excuse have been met—and no excuse includes lack of free will 
as a criterion—the defendant will be excused without any reference 
whatsoever to free will as an independent ground for excuse. 
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free will, which is 
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything other 
than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary foundation for 
holding anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal conduct.  
Philosophers and others have debated these issues in various forms for 
millennia, and there is no resolution in sight.  Indeed, some people might 
think that the problem is insoluble.  This is a philosophical issue, but it is not 
a problem for the law, and neuroscience raises no new challenge to this 
conclusion.  Solving the free will problem would have profound 
implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, such as blame and 
punishment, but having or lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of 
any civil or criminal law doctrine. 
Neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal science that 
appears deterministically to explain behavior.  Neuroscience thus joins 
social structural variables, behaviorism, genetics, and other scientific 
explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for behavior.  
In principle, however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neuroscience 
is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predecessors.  No 
science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that libertarian free will 
does or does not exist.  As long as free will in the strong sense is not 
foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a criterion at the 
doctrinal level, the truth of determinism or universal causation poses no 
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threat to legal responsibility.  Neuroscience may help shed light on folk-
psychological excusing conditions, such as automatism or legal insanity, but 
the truth of determinism is not an excusing condition.  The law will be 
fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience, or any other science, can 
conclusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and that we 
are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are causally effective.  
This is a different question from whether determinism undermines 
responsibility, however, and this Article returns to it below. 
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but 
causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition.  I 
termed this confusion the “fundamental psycholegal error.”37  At most, 
causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether a 
genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present.  
Brain causation—or any other kind of causation—does not mean that we 
are automatons, not really acting agents at all, or otherwise excused.  Even 
a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an excusing condition.  For 
example, imagine an armed robber who suffers from intermittent 
hypomania and who only robs when he is clinically hypomanic because 
only then does he feel sufficiently energetic and confident.  In other words, 
the hypomania is a “but for” cause of his robberies.  Nevertheless, he would 
not be excused for an armed robbery because hypomania seldom 
compromises rational capacity sufficiently to warrant an excuse.  If he 
committed an armed robbery under the influence of a delusional belief his 
mania produced, then he might be excused by reason of legal insanity.  In 
that case, the excusing condition would be compromised rationality and not 
the mania per se.  In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal 
conduct, like any other type of causal explanation, does not per se mitigate 
or excuse.  It only provides evidence that might help the law resolve 
whether a genuine excuse existed, or it may in the future provide data that 
might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures. 
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal 
conditions without which the behavior would not have occurred, including 
brain causation, which is always part of the causal explanation for any 
behavior.  If causation were an excusing condition per se, then no one would 
be responsible for any behavior.  Some people might welcome such a 
conclusion and believe that responsibility is impossible, but this is not the 
legal and moral world we inhabit.  The law holds most adults responsible 
for most of their conduct, and genuine excusing conditions are limited.  
Unless the person’s history or mental condition, for example, provides 
 
37.  Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–94 (1994). 
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evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condition, such as lack of 
rational capacity, there is no reason for excuse or mitigation. 
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but 
causation—including brain causation—is not the equivalent of compulsion.  
Part IV showed that compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and 
normative.  It is crucial to recognize that most human action is not plausibly 
the result of either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by 
its necessary and sufficient causes—including brain causation.  Even 
abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling.  To illustrate, suppose that 
a person has weak pedophilic urges and weak sexual urges in general.  If 
this person molested a child, there would be no ground for a compulsion 
excuse.  If causation were the equivalent of compulsion, all behavior would 
be compelled and no one would be responsible.  Once again, this is not a 
plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions.  Causal information 
from neuroscience might help us resolve questions concerning whether 
legal compulsion existed, or it might be a guide to prophylactic or 
rehabilitative measures when dealing with plausible legal compulsion.  
Causation, however, is not per se compulsion. 
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science, can 
enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions, but predictability is also not 
a per se excusing or mitigating condition, even if the predictability of the 
behavior is perfect.  To understand this, consider how many things we do 
that are perfectly predictable but for which there is no plausible excusing 
or mitigating condition.  If the variables that enhance prediction also 
produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condition, then excuse or 
mitigation is justified for the latter reason and independent of the 
prediction. 
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of childhood 
abuse coupled with a specific, genetically produced enzyme abnormality 
that produces a neurotransmitter deficit increases the risk that a person will 
behave antisocially as an adolescent or young adult.38  Does this mean that 
an offender with this gene by environment interaction is not responsible or 
less responsible?  No.  The offender may not be fully responsible or 
responsible at all but not because there is a causal explanation.  What is the 
intermediary excusing or mitigating principle?  Are these people, for 
instance, more impulsive?  Are they lacking rationality?  What is the actual 
excusing or mitigating condition? 
Most informed people are not “dualists” concerning the relation 
 
38.  See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in 
Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002).  Indeed, the risk is nine times higher. 
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between the mind and the brain.  That is, they no longer think that our 
minds (or “souls”) are independent of our brains and bodies more generally 
and can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies.  It may seem as 
if the law’s emphasis on the importance of mental states as causing behavior 
is based on a prescientific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the 
case.  Although the brain enables the mind, we have no idea how this occurs 
and have no idea how action is possible.39  It is clear that, at the least, mental 
states are dependent upon or supervene on brain states, but neither 
neuroscience nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states do 
not play an independent and partial causal role. 
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action relation, the 
Introduction to this Article showed that some scientists question whether 
mental states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic 
appendixes that evolution has created but that have no genuine function.  
These claims are not strawpersons.  They are made by serious, thoughtful 
people.40  As discussed in Part VIII below, if accepted, they would create a 
complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal 
responsibility and more widely.  
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law policy, doctrine, 
and adjudication must always keep the folk-psychological view present in 
their minds when considering claims or evidence from neuroscience and 
must always question how the science is legally relevant to the law’s action 
and mental-states criteria.  The truth of determinism, causation, and 
predictability do not in themselves answer any doctrinal or policy issue. 
VI. LOST IN TRANSLATION? LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE NEED FOR 
TRANSLATION 
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to the 
criminal law’s responsibility doctrines canvassed in Part IV?  We must 
begin with a distinction between internal relevance and external 
relevance.  An internal contribution or critique accepts the general 
coherence and legitimacy of a set of legal doctrines, practices, or 
institutions and attempts to explain or alter them.  For example, an 
internal contribution to criminal responsibility may suggest the need for 
doctrinal reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest that 
the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or illegitimate.  By 
contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests that the doctrines, 
practices, or institutions are incoherent, illegitimate, or unjustified.  
 
39.  See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175. 
40.  See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 219. 
 2015] CRIMINAL LAW AND COMMON SENSE 59 
Because a radical, external critique has little possibility of success at 
present (as is explained below), I make the simplifying assumption that 
the contributions of neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be 
translated into the law’s folk-psychological concepts. 
The law’s criteria for responsibility and competence are essentially 
behavioral—acts and mental states.  The criteria of neuroscience are 
mechanistic—neural structure and function.  Is the apparent chasm 
between those two types of discourse bridgeable?  This is a familiar 
question in the field of law and mental health,41 but there is even greater 
dissonance in law and neuroscience.  Psychiatry and psychology sometimes 
treat behavior mechanistically, sometimes treat it folk psychologically, and 
sometimes blend the two.  Consider depression, which may be understood 
both biologically and psychologically.  Even the most biologically oriented 
psychiatrist treating a depressed patient with antidepressant medication 
will also inquire about the course of the patient’s life (if the psychiatrist is 
competent).  In many cases, the psychological sciences are quite close to 
folk psychology in approach.  Neuroscience, in contrast, is purely 
mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and discourse.  
Neurons, neural networks, and the connectome do not act intentionally for 
reasons.  They have no sense of past, present, or future and no aspirations.  
They do not recognize that they will die.  Thus, the gap will be harder to 
bridge for neuroscience than for psychiatry and psychology. 
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this 
occurs).  Therefore, facts we learn about brains in general, or about a 
specific brain, could in principle provide useful information about mental 
states and about human capacities in general and in specific cases.  Some 
believe that this conclusion is a category error.42  This is a plausible view, 
and perhaps it is correct.  If it is, then the whole subject of the relation of 
neuroscience to law is mostly empty.  Let us, therefore, bracket this 
pessimistic view and determine what follows from the more optimistic 
position that what we learn about the brain and nervous system can be 
potentially helpful to resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the 
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological framework. 
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant 
because it makes a proposition about responsibility more or less likely to 
be true.  Any legal criterion must be established independently, and 
 
41.  See, e.g., ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 95–96 (1984).  
42.  See, e.g., MAX R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
NEUROSCIENCE 112, 270, 360, 381 (2003).  PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 135, also 
share much of this caution. 
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biological evidence must be translated into the criminal law’s folk-
psychological behavioral criteria.  That is, the expert must be able to explain 
precisely how the neuroevidence bears on whether the agent acted, formed 
the required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excusing condition.  If the 
evidence is not directly relevant, the expert should be able to explain the 
chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria.  No hand-
waving should be permitted by allowing the expert or scholar to move 
directly from indirect evidence to a legal conclusion.  The chain of reasoning 
should be clear and plausible.  At present, as I explain in the next part, few 
such data exist, but neuroscience is advancing so rapidly that such data may 
exist in the near or medium term.  Moreover, the argument is conceptual 
and does not depend on any particular neuroscience findings. 
The problem of translation is going to be fearsomely hard.  As the next 
part indicates, present neuroscience is not likely to help us with the 
marginal legal cases, even if the translation problem is solved in an 
individual case.  For the most part, we will have to rely on careful behavioral 
investigation and plenty of common sense. 
VII.THE PRESENT LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the 
hardest problems in all science.  Once again, we have no idea how the brain 
enables the mind or how action is possible.43  The brain-mind-action 
relation is a mystery not because it is inherently not subject to scientific 
explanation, but because the problem is so hard.  For example, we would 
like to know the difference between a neuromuscular spasm and 
intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same way.  The former is a 
purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot 
explain the difference between the two.  The philosopher, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, famously asked: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, 
my arm goes up.  And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the 
fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”44  We know 
that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for having mental states 
and for acting.  After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states 
and are not acting.  Still, we do not know how mental states and action are 
caused. 
 
43.  See MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 18, at 11–12; Adolphs, supra note 18, at 175. 
44.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 621 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1953) (1953). 
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Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other 
neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal 
knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little information 
that is legally relevant.  The scientific problems are fearsomely difficult.  
Only in the present century have researchers begun to accumulate much 
data from fMRI imaging, which is the technology that has generated most 
of the legal interest.  New artifacts are constantly being discovered.45  
Moreover, virtually no studies have been performed to address specifically 
legal questions.  The criminal justice system should not expect too much of 
a young science that uses new technologies to investigate some of the most 
dreadfully difficult problems in science and that does not directly address 
questions of legal interest. 
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a few 
preliminary points of general applicability must be addressed.  The first and 
most important is contained in the message of Part V.  Causation by 
biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, does not per 
se create an excusing or mitigating condition.  Any excusing condition must 
be established independently.  The goal is always to translate the biological 
evidence into the criminal law’s folk-psychological criteria.  Assessing 
criminal responsibility involves a retrospective evaluation of the 
defendant’s mental states at the time of the crime.  No criminal wears a 
portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides a 
measurement at the time of the crime, at least not yet.  Further, 
neuroscience is insufficiently developed to detect specific, legally relevant 
mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for 
even a severe mental disorder.46  Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural 
structure and function that bear on legally relevant capacities, such as the 
capacity for rationality and control, may be temporally stable in general or 
in individual cases.  If they are, neuroevidence may permit a reasonably 
 
45.  E.g., Craig M. Bennett et al., The Principled Control of False Positives in 
Neuroimaging, 4 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 417 (2009) (indicating that 
a high percentage of previous fMRI studies did not properly control for false positives by 
controlling for what is called “multiple comparisons”).  This problem was termed by one group 
of authors “voodoo correlations,” but they toned back the claim to more scientifically 
respectable language.  Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of 
Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274 (2009).  Needless 
to say, there was pushback against such criticisms.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., 
Correlations in Social Neuroscience Aren’t Voodoo: A Commentary on Vul et al. (2009), 4 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 299 (2009).  As any old country lawyer knows, when a stone is thrown 
into a pack of dogs, the one that gets hit yelps. 
46.  Stephen J. Morse & William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal 
Competence, and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 150, 159–60, 167 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013). 
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valid retrospective inference about the defendant’s rational and control 
capacities and their impact on criminal behavior.  This will, of course, 
depend on the existence of adequate science to do this.  We currently lack 
such science,47 but future research may provide the necessary data.48 
Now let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty in cognitive, 
affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-disciplines most relevant to law.  
At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings involve very small 
numbers of subjects, although this phenomenon is rapidly starting to 
change as the cost of scanning decreases.  Future studies will have more 
statistical power.  Most of the studies have been done on college and 
university students, who are hardly a random sample of the population 
generally and of criminal offenders specifically.  There is also a serious 
question of whether findings based on subjects’ behavior and brain activity 
in a scanner would apply to real-world situations.  This is known as the 
problem of “ecological validity.”  Does a subject’s performance in a 
laboratory on an executive function task in a scanner really predict the 
person’s ability to resist criminal offending?49  
Most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the average 
finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any 
actual subject in the study.  Replications are few, which is especially 
important for law.  Policy and adjudication should not be influenced by 
findings that are insufficiently established, and replications of findings are 
 
47.  Id. at 166–67 (explaining generally that, except in the cases of a few well-characterized 
medical disorders such as epilepsy, current neuroscience has little to add to resolving questions 
of criminal responsibility). 
48.  In contrast, questions concerning various criminal competencies, such as competence to 
stand trial or to plead guilty, and predictions of future behavior are based on a subject’s present 
condition.  Thus, the problems besetting retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to such 
issues.  The criteria for competence are functional.  They ask whether the subject can perform 
some task—such as understanding the nature of a criminal proceeding or understanding a 
treatment option that is offered—at a level the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant 
respecting the subject’s choice and autonomy.  Prediction questions simply ask about the 
probability of some particular future behavior’s occurring within some time frame, but the law’s 
criteria for predictions are typically framed as standards and thus allow room for normative 
judgment. 
49.  For example, the famous Stroop test asks subjects to state the color in which a color 
word is written, rather than simply to read the word itself.  Thus, if the word “red” is written in 
yellow, the correct answer is yellow.  We all have what is known as a strong prepotent response 
(a strong behavioral disposition) simply to read the word rather than to identify the color in 
which it is written.  It takes a lot of inhibitory ability to refrain from the prepotent response.  
But are people who do poorly on the Stroop more predisposed to commit violent crimes even 
if the associated brain activation is consistent with decreased prefrontal control in subjects?  
We do not know.  And in any case, what legally relevant, extra information does the 
neuroscience add to the behavioral data with which it was correlated? 
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crucial to our confidence in a result, especially given the problem of 
publication bias.  Finally, the neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal 
behavior is largely in its infancy and what is known is quite coarse-grained 
and correlational, rather than fine-grained and causal.50  What is being 
investigated is an association between a condition or a task in the scanner 
and brain activity.  These studies do not demonstrate that the brain activity 
is a sensitive diagnostic marker for the condition or either a necessary, 
sufficient, or predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task that is 
being done in the scanner.  Any language that suggests otherwise—such as 
claiming that some brain region is the neural substrate for the behavior—is 
simply not justifiable based on the methodology of most studies.  Such 
inferences are only justified if everything else in the brain remained 
constant, which is seldom the case.51  Moreover, activity in the same region 
may be associated with diametrically opposite behavioral phenomena—for 
example, love and hate. 
There are also technical and research design difficulties.  It takes many 
mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI data to the images 
of the brain that are increasingly familiar.  Explaining these transformations 
is beyond me, but I do understand that the likelihood that an investigator 
will find a statistically significant result depends on how the researcher sets 
the threshold for significance.  There is dispute about this, and the threshold 
levels are conventional.  If the threshold changes, so does the outcome.  I 
have been convinced by neuroscience colleagues that many such technical 
difficulties have largely been solved, but research design and potentially 
unjustified inferences from the studies are still an acute problem.  It is 
extraordinarily difficult to control for all conceivable artifacts.  
Consequently, there are often problems of over-inference.  
Neuroscience also shares with other sciences what is known as the G2i 
problem, which is how to make inferences about a particular individual 
based on group data.52  Scientists are interested in how the world works 
and produce general information.  Law is often concerned with individual 
cases, and it is difficult to know how properly to apply relevant group 
data.  For example, as noted, a neuroscience study that reports increased 
activation in some brain region of interest bases its conclusion on 
averaging the activation across all the subjects, but no subject’s brain may 
 
50.  See, e.g., Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the Brain, 5 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 716 (2010) (providing a cautious, thorough overview of the scientific 
and practical problems facing cognitive and social neuroscience). 
51.  Adolphs, supra note 18, at 173. 
52.  See generally David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to 
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014). 
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have activated precisely in the area identified.  If such group data are 
permitted, as they now are for functions such as predictions, the question 
is how to use probabilistic data to answer what is often a binary question.53  
This is a topic under intensive investigation at present, and I assume 
progress will be made. 
Over time, all these problems identified may ease as imaging and other 
techniques become less expensive and more accurate, research designs 
become more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science increases 
generally. 
How should the law respond when valid and relevant neuroevidence is 
inconsistent with the defendant’s behavior?  Recall that the criminal law’s 
criteria are all behavioral—actions and mental states.  Therefore, cases of 
malingering aside, actions speak louder than images.  This is a truism for all 
criminal responsibility.  If the finding of any test or measurement of 
behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must 
believe the real world behavioral evidence because it is more direct and 
probative of the law’s behavioral criteria.  For example, if the person 
behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances, the agent is rational 
even if the brain appears structurally or functionally abnormal.  We 
confidently knew that some people were behaviorally abnormal, such as 
being psychotic (grossly out of touch with reality), long before there were 
any psychological or neurological tests for such abnormalities.  
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive.  Suppose 
someone complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the 
question is whether the subject actually does have back pain.  We know that 
many people with abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many 
people who complain of back pain have normal spines.  If the person is 
claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence that the person 
regularly exercises on a trampoline without difficulty indicates that there is 
no disability caused by back pain.  If there is reason to suspect malingering, 
however, and there is not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a 
completely normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant 
 
53.  For an interesting current example of this problem in the context of the capital 
punishment proceeding for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the defendant convicted of the Boston 
Marathon bombings, see Sally Satel & Scott O. Lilienfeld, The “Immature Teen Brain” Defense 
and the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Trial, WASH. POST (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/the-immature-teen-
brain-defense-and-the-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-trial/ [http://perma.cc/8F6J-W5K5], and Sally Satel 
& Scott O. Lilienfeld, Neuro-expert testifies for Tsarnaev, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/11/neuro-expert-
testifies-for-tsarnaev/ [http://perma.cc/VB4D-PVBP].  In the event, the jury was not swayed by 
the general neuroscientific data about the juvenile brain and sentenced Tsarnaev to death. 
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is malingering.  Unless the correlation between the image and the legally 
relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such evidence will be of 
limited help.  Further, although the neuroscience of pain is making 
advances,54 neuroscience cannot be used at present to diagnose mental 
disorder because scanning is insufficiently sensitive for these purposes.55 
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential contribution of 
neuroscience is large.  Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that 
neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help.  I term the reason 
for this the “clear cut” problem.56  Virtually all neuroscience studies of 
potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been 
identified as of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that 
behavior’s neural correlates.  Neuroscientists do not go on general “fishing” 
expeditions.57  There is usually some bit of behavior—such as addiction, 
schizophrenia or impulsivity—that investigators would like to understand 
better by investigating its neural correlates.  To do this properly 
presupposes that the researchers have already well-characterized and 
validated the behavior under neuroscientific investigation.  Thus, neurodata 
can be no more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.  In such 
cases, the neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly 
identified behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear.  Less clear 
behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less clear 
behavior is greater between experimental and comparison subjects.  Thus, 
the neural markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve 
behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior, and they are 
unnecessary if the behavior is sufficiently clear. 
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not 
 
54.  Amanda C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can 
Help Transform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099 (forthcoming 2015). 
55.  Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391 (2009).  Many studies 
do find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are 
too small to be used diagnostically.  See generally John P.A. Ioannidis, Excess Significance Bias 
in the Literature on Brain Volume Abnormalities, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 773 (2011) 
(claiming, based on a meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients with 
mental disorders, that many more studies than should be expected found statistically significant 
results and that this can be best explained by bias in the reporting of the data). 
56.  Morse, supra note 6, at 540.   
57.  For an amusing exception, see Craig M. Bennett et al., Neural Correlates of 
Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument for Proper 
Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SERENDIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1 (2009), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.161.8384&rep=rep1&type=pdf [http
://perma.cc/VU7B-K5DJ].  The study scanned a dead Atlantic salmon to demonstrate that 
significant results can be obtained from the most unpromising investigation unless the research 
design properly controls for chance findings (false positives). 
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well-characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly 
different behavior.  In general, however, the existence of legally relevant 
behavior will already be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation 
is begun.  For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality.  If, 
as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them 
because they lack such knowledge.  We might learn a great deal about the 
neural correlates of such psychological abnormalities.  But we already knew 
without neuroscientic data that these abnormalities existed, and we had a 
firm view of their normative significance.  In the future, however, we may 
learn more about the causal link between the brain and behavior, and 
studies may be devised that are more directly legally relevant.  I suspect 
that we are unlikely to make substantial progress with neural assessment of 
legally relevant mental content, but we are likely to learn more about 
capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation. 
If actions speak louder than images and the clear cut problem exists, 
however, what room is there for introducing neuroevidence in legal cases?  
Let us begin with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear and 
permits an equally clear inference about the defendant’s mental state.  For 
example, lay people may not know the technical term to apply to people 
who are manifestly out of touch with reality, but they will readily recognize 
this unfortunate condition.  No further tests of any sort will be necessary to 
prove that the subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality.  In such 
cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase our 
confidence in what we already had confidently concluded.  Determining if 
it is worth collecting the neuroevidence will depend on whether the cost-
benefit analysis justifies obtaining convergent evidence. 
Roper v. Simmons is the most striking example of a case in which the 
behavioral evidence was clear.58  In Roper, the United States Supreme 
Court categorically excluded the death penalty for capital murderers who 
killed when they were sixteen or seventeen years old on the grounds that 
adolescents do not deserve the death penalty.59  The amicus briefs were 
replete with neuroscience data showing that the brains of late adolescents 
are not fully, biologically mature, and advocates used these data to suggest 
that adolescent killers could not be fairly put to death.60  Now, we already 
knew from commonsense observation and from rigorous behavioral studies 
that juveniles are on average less rational than adults.  What could the 
 
58.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
59.  Id. at 578–79. 
60.  E.g., Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). 
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neuroscientific evidence about the juvenile brain have added?  It was 
consistent with the undeniable behavioral data and perhaps provided a 
partial causal explanation of the behavioral differences.  The proffered 
neuroscience data were therefore merely additive and only indirectly 
relevant, and the Supreme Court did not cite these data, except perhaps by 
implication when it referred vaguely to “other” scientific evidence.61 
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than 
adults, to exclude them categorically from the death penalty is a normative 
legal question and not a scientific or psychological question.  Advocates 
claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are 
insufficiently responsible to be executed, thus confusing the positive and 
the normative.  The neuroscience evidence in no way independently 
confirms that adolescents are less responsible.  If the behavioral differences 
between adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their 
brains were quite different.  Similarly, if the behavioral differences were 
sufficient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, then it would 
not matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable.  If the brains 
were indistinguishable, the most sensible inference would be that 
neuroscience is not yet sensitive enough to track the behavioral differences, 
not that we are mistaken about whether behavioral differences exist.  
For another example, suppose that in an insanity defense case the 
question is whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder 
such as schizophrenia.  In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no 
neurodata will be necessary.  Investigators have discovered various small, 
but statistically significant, differences in neural structure or function 
between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia and those 
who are not.62  Nonetheless in a behaviorally unclear case, the overlap 
 
61.  Id. at 569, 573.  The Supreme Court referred generally to other science, but it was not 
clear whether neuroscience played a specific role.  The Supreme Court did cite neuroscientific 
findings in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–82 (2010), which categorically excluded juveniles 
from life without the possibility of parole in non-homicide cases, and in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), which held that the sentence of life without possibility of parole was 
constitutional for juveniles who committed homicide crimes but that it was unconstitutional to 
impose this penalty mandatorily.  In both cases, the citation was conclusory and generally non-
specific, and I believe it was dictum.  The Supreme Court was responding in Graham to an 
argument that no party had seriously made, which was that the science of adolescent development 
had changed significantly since Roper was decided.  Also in Miller, the Court drew a distinction 
between social science and “science.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5.  Social science, like 
neuroscience, is science (and arguably more directly relevant to legal criteria for the reasons this 
Article has discussed).  The important distinctions are between good and bad science and legally 
relevant and legally irrelevant science. 
62.  On the other hand, there may be reason to be cautious about such findings.  See 
generally Ioannidis, supra note 55.  
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between data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and people 
without the disorder is so great that a scan is insufficiently sensitive to be 
used for diagnostic purposes.  In short, at present in those cases in which 
the neuroscience would be most helpful, it has little to contribute.  Again, 
this situation may change if neural markers become more diagnostically 
sensitive for legally relevant criteria. 
Some people think that executive capacity—the congeries of cognitive 
and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human behavior—
is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an offender’s true 
culpability.  After all, there is an attractive moral case that people with a 
substantial lack of these capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct 
satisfied the prima facie case for the crime charged.  Perhaps neuroscience 
can provide specific data previously unavailable to identify executive 
capacity differences more precisely. 
There are two problems, however.  First, significant problems with 
executive capacity are readily apparent without testing, and criminal law 
simply will not adopt fine-grained culpability criteria.  Second, the 
correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and 
actual real world behavior is not terribly strong.63  Only a small fraction of 
the variance is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the types of 
tasks the psychological tests use.  Consequently, we are far from able to use 
neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive-capacity 
differences that are valid in real world contexts.  
VIII.THE RADICAL NEUROCHALLENGE: ARE WE VICTIMS OF 
NEURONAL CIRCUMSTANCES? 
This part addresses the claim and hope raised earlier that neuroscience 
will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by demonstrating that 
we are “merely victims of neuronal circumstances” (or some similar claim 
that denies human agency).  This claim holds that we are not the kinds of 
intentional creatures we think we are.  If our mental states play no role in 
our behavior and are simply epiphenomenal, then traditional notions of 
responsibility based on mental states and on actions guided by mental 
states would be imperiled.  But is the rich explanatory apparatus of 
intentionality simply a post hoc rationalization that the brains of hapless 
homo sapiens construct to explain what their brains have already done?  
Will the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an outmoded 
 
63.  See, e.g., Russell A. Barkley & Kevin R. Murphy, Impairment in Occupational 
Functioning and Adult ADHD: The Predictive Utility of Executive Function (EF) Ratings 
Versus EF Tests, 25 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 157 (2010). 
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relic of a prescientific and cruel age?  If so, criminal law is not the only area 
of law in peril.  What will be the fate of contracts, for example, when a 
biological machine that was formerly called a person claims that it should 
not be bound because it did not make a contract?  The contract is also 
simply the outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.” 
Before continuing, we must understand that the compatibilist 
metaphysics adopted in Part III does not save agency if the radical claim is 
true.  If determinism is true, two states of the world concerning agency are 
possible: agency exists or it does not.  Compatibilism assumes that agency 
is true because it holds that agents can be responsible in a determinist 
universe.  It thus essentially begs the question against the radical claim.  If 
the radical claim is true, then compatibilism is false because no 
responsibility is possible if we are not agents.  It is an incoherent notion to 
have genuine responsibility without agency.  The question is whether the 
radical claim is true. 
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-mind-action 
connections, to claim that we should radically change our conceptions of 
ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience is a 
form of “neuroarrogance.”  Although I predict that we will see far more 
numerous attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have 
elsewhere argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons, there is no 
reason at present to believe that we are not agents.64  In particular, I can 
report that the “Libet industry” that overclaimed about the alleged moral 
and legal implications of neuroscientist Benjamin Libet’s findings appears 
to be bankrupt.  His work found that there was brain activity in the 
supplemental motor area prior to awareness of the urge to bodily 
movements and before movements occurred.  This work and the findings 
of other similar investigations led to the assertion that our brains do all 
the causal work in explaining behavior.  Recent conceptual and empirical 
work seems to have exploded these claims.65  In short, I doubt that this 
 
64.  Morse, supra note 6, at 543–54; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk 
Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 
(2008). 
65.  See, e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, EFFECTIVE INTENTIONS: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUS 
WILL (2009); ALFRED R. MELE, FREE: WHY SCIENCE HASN’T DISPROVED FREE WILL 
(2014); Moore, supra note 7; Parashkev Nachev & Peter Hacker, The Neural Antecedents to 
Voluntary Action: Response to Commentaries, 6 COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 180 (2015); 
Aaron Schurger et al., An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-
Initiated Movement, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E2904, (2012); Aaron Schurger & Sebo 
Uithol, Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action, 2015 REV. PHIL. 
PSYCH. (ONLINE FIRST ARTICLE) 1, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-014-0223-
2 [http://perma.cc/7DJL-5BWZ]. 
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industry will emerge from whatever chapter of the bankruptcy code 
applies in such cases.  It is possible that we are not agents, but the current 
science does not remotely demonstrate that this is true.  The burden of 
persuasion is firmly on the proponents of the radical view. 
Most important, the radical view entails no positive agenda.  If the truth 
of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, no particular moral, 
legal, or political conclusions follow from it.66  The radical view provides no 
guide as to how one should live or how one should respond to the truth of 
reductive mechanism.  Normativity depends on reason, and thus the radical 
view is normatively inert.  Reasons are mental states.  If reasons do not 
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals, politics, or 
legal rules or to do anything at all.  
Suppose we are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not 
intentional, rational agents after all.67  If it is really “true” that we do not 
have mental states or, slightly more plausibly, that our mental states are 
epiphenomenal and play no role in the causation of our actions, what 
should we do now?  If it is true, we know that it is an illusion to think that 
our deliberations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world.  We 
also know, however, that we experience sensations—such as pleasure and 
pain—and care about what happens to us and to the world.  We cannot just 
sit quietly and wait for our brains to activate, for determinism to happen.  
We must, and will, deliberate and act.  And if we do not act in accord with 
the “truth” that the radical view suggests, we cannot be blamed.  Our brains 
made us do it. 
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard 
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore 
impossible, we might still believe that the law would not necessarily have to 
give up the concept of incentives.  Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that 
we would have to keep punishing people for practical purposes.68  Such an 
account would be consistent with “black box” accounts of economic 
incentives that simply depend on the relation between inputs and outputs 
 
66.  This line of thought was first suggested by Professor Mitchell Berman in the context 
of a discussion of determinism and normativity.  Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and 
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 271 n.34 (2008). 
67.  Of course, the notion of being “convinced” would be an illusion, too.  Being convinced 
means that we are persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by 
anything.  A mechanism is simply neurophysically transformed. 
68.  Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 218.  The use of the word “punish” is a solecism in 
their account.  Punishment in criminal justice has a constitutive moral meaning associated with 
guilt and desert.  It is not simply a negative reinforcement.  They should more properly be 
talking simply in terms of positive and negative reinforcements. 
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without considering the mind as a mediator between the two.  For those 
who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of human behavior 
entails complete consequentialism, this conclusion might be welcomed. 
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal 
contradiction just explored.  What is the nature of the agent that is 
discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behavior?  Could 
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules 
simply be epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already 
done?  How do we decide which behaviors to reinforce positively or 
negatively?  What role does reason—a property of thoughts and agents, not 
a property of brains—play in this decision? 
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing 
person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good 
reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view.  We are 
not Pinocchios, and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.  And 
this is a very good thing.  Ultimately, I believe that the vision of the person, 
of interpersonal relations, and of society the radical view entails bleaches 
the soul.  In the concrete and practical world we live in, we must be guided 
by our values and a vision of the good life.  I do not want to live in the 
radical’s world that is stripped of genuine agency, desert, autonomy, and 
dignity.  For all its imperfections, the criminal law’s vision of the person 
and agency is more respectful and humane. 
IX. THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS NEUROLAW OPTIMISM 
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally cautious about 
the current contributions that neuroscience can make to criminal law policy, 
doctrine, and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the near and 
intermediate term contributions neuroscience can potentially make to our 
ordinary, traditional, folk-psychological criminal law doctrine and practice.  
In other words, neuroscience may make a positive contribution even 
though there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature of the 
person and the criteria for criminal responsibility.  The legal regime to 
which neuroscience will contribute will continue to take people seriously as 
people—as autonomous agents who may fairly be blamed and punished 
based on their mental states and actions. 
In general, my hope is that over time there will be feedback between 
the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientific data.  Each might 
inform the other.  Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new 
neuroscientific studies, for example, and the neuroscientific studies might 
help refine the folk-psychological categories.  The ultimate goal would be a 
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reflective, conceptual–empirical equilibrium.  At present, I think much of 
the most promising legally relevant research concerns areas other than 
criminal justice,69 but in what follows I will focus on criminal law. 
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which 
neuroscience may be of assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk-
psychological assumption underlying a legal rule is incorrect; (2) data 
suggesting the need for new or reformed legal doctrine; (3) evidence that 
helps adjudicate an individual case; and (4) data that help efficient 
adjudication or administration of criminal justice. 
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychological 
assumptions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect.  If so, the 
doctrine should change.  For example, it is commonly assumed that agents 
intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions.  In many or 
most cases it seems that they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to 
demonstrate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we think 
because, say, more apparent actions are automatic than is currently 
realized.70  In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the 
prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more caution. 
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new or reformed 
legal doctrine.  For example, control tests for legal insanity have been 
disfavored for some decades because they are ill understood and hard to 
assess.  It is at present impossible to distinguish “cannot” from “will not,” 
which is one of the reasons both the American Bar Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association both recommended abolition of control 
tests for legal insanity in the wake of the unpopular Hinckley verdict.71  
Perhaps neuroscientific information will help to demonstrate and to prove 
the existence of control difficulties that are independent of cognitive 
 
69.  E.g., objective identification of pain, which would transform tort and disability law.  
See Pustilnik, supra note 54. 
70.  How successfully such research can be accomplished is difficult to predict, especially 
if the folk wisdom concerns content rather than functions or capacities.  In the example given, 
a good working definition of automaticity would be necessary, and “experimental” subjects 
being scanned would have to be reliably in an automatic state.  This will be exceedingly difficult 
research to do.  Also, if the real world behavior and the neuroscience seem inconsistent, with 
rare exception the behavior would have to be considered the accurate measure.  Recall the 
example from Part VII concerning adolescence.  If neuroscience were not able to distinguish 
average adolescent from average adult brains, the sensible conclusions based on common sense 
and behavioral studies would be that adolescents on average behave less rationally and that the 
neuroscience is not yet sufficiently advanced to permit identification of neural differences. 
71.  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339-42 (1989); 
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983). 
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incapacities.72  If so, then independent control tests may be justified and can 
be rationally assessed after all.  More generally, perhaps a larger percentage 
of offenders than we currently believe have such grave control difficulties 
that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not available in criminal 
law today.73  Neuroscience might help us discover that fact.  If that were 
true, justice would be served by adopting a generic mitigating doctrine.  On 
the other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties are not so common, we 
could be more confident of the justice of current doctrine. 
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual 
cases.  Consider the insanity defense again.  As in United States v. Hinckley,74 
there is often dispute about whether a defendant claiming legal insanity 
suffered from a mental disorder, which disorder the defendant suffered 
from, or how severe the disorder was.75  At present, these questions must be 
resolved entirely behaviorally, and there is often room for considerable 
disagreement about inferences drawn from the defendant’s actions, 
including utterances.  In the future, neuroscience might help resolve such 
questions if the clear-cut problem difficulty can be solved.  In the 
foreseeable future, I doubt that neuroscience will be able to help identify 
the presence or absence of specific mens rea because mind reading seems 
nearly impossible, but we may be able to identify brain states that suggest 
that a subject is lying or is familiar with a place he denies recognizing.76 
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more 
efficiently.  For example, the criminal justice system makes predictions 
 
72.  See Michael S. Moore, The Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE: STATE OF THE ART (Dennis Patterson ed., forthcoming 2016).  Moore makes 
the most thorough attempt to date to provide both the folk-psychological mechanism for loss 
of control and a neuroscientific agenda for studying it.  I believe, however, that the mechanism 
he describes is better understood as a cognitive rationality defect and that such defects are the 
true source of alleged “loss of control” cases that might warrant mitigation or excuse.  I address 
this claim more fully in Stephen J. Morse, Moore on the Mind, in LEGAL, MORAL AND 
METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE (Kimberly K. Ferzan & 
Stephen J. Morse eds., forthcoming 2016). 
73.  I have proposed a generic mitigating condition that would address both cognitive and 
control incapacities short of those warranting a full excuse.  Stephen J. Morse, Diminished 
Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003). 
74.  525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). 
75.  Id. at 1346. 
76.  Henry T. Greely, Mind Reading, Neuroscience, and the Law, in A PRIMER ON 
CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 46, at 120.  This is known as “brain reading” 
because it identifies neural correlates of a mental process rather than the subject’s specific 
mental content.  The latter would be “mind reading.”  For example, particular brain activation 
might reliably indicate whether the subject was adding or subtracting, but it could not show 
what specific numbers were being added or subtracted.  John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading 
Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007). 
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about future dangerous behavior for purposes of bail, sentencing (including 
capital sentencing), and parole.  If we have already decided that it is justified 
to use dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to 
imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we are in fact able 
to do it more accurately.77  Behavioral prediction techniques already exist.  
The question is whether neuroscientific variables can add value by 
increasing the accuracy of such predictions considering the cost of 
gathering such data.  Very recently, two studies have been published 
showing the potential usefulness of neural markers for enhancing the 
accuracy of predictions of antisocial conduct.78  Although these must be 
considered preliminary, “proof of concept” studies,79 it is perfectly plausible 
that in the future genuinely valid, cost–benefit, justified neural markers will 
be identified and, thus, prediction decisions will be more accurate and just. 
X. CONCLUSION 
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and 
accurate criminal law policy, doctrine, and individual case adjudication.  
This was the conclusion reached when I tentatively identified “Brain 
Overclaim Syndrome” nine years ago, and it remains true today.  In the 
future, however, as the philosophies of mind and action and neuroscience 
mutually mature and inform one another, neuroscience will help us 
understand criminal behavior.  Although no radical transformation of 
criminal justice is likely to occur, neuroscience can inform criminal justice 
as long as it is relevant to law and translated into the law’s folk-
psychological framework and criteria.  The home remedies are working, 
and please don’t wake me until the doctor comes.  As Jerry Fodor 
counseled, “[E]verything is going to be all right.”80 
 
 
77.  2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY 
MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 98 
(2015) (approvingly quoting this position of mine). 
78.  Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 6223 (2013); Dustin A. Pardini et al., Lower Amygdala Volume in Men Is Associated with 
Childhood Aggression, Early Psychopathic Traits, and Future Violence, 75 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 73 (2014). 
79.  For example, a re-analysis of the Aharoni study by Russell Poldrack, a noted 
“neuromethodologist,” demonstrated that the effect size was tiny.  Russell Poldrack, How Well 
Can We Predict Future Criminal Acts from fMRI Data?, RUSSPOLDRACK.ORG (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.russpoldrack.org/search?q=aharoni [http://perma.cc/X5TP-LGZ8].  Also, the study 
used good, but not the best, behavioral predictive methods for comparison. 
80.  FODOR, supra note 5, at xii. 
